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Abstract
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) aims to pro-
vide an isolated execution environment, known as an
enclave, for a user-level process to maximize its con-
fidentiality and integrity. In this paper, we study how
uninitialized data inside a secure enclave can be leaked
via structure padding. We found that, during ECALL and
OCALL, proxy functions that are automatically generated
by the Intel SGX Software Development Kit (SDK)
fully copy structure variables from an enclave to the
normal memory to return the result of an ECALL function
and to pass input parameters to an OCALL function. If the
structure variables contain padding bytes, uninitialized
enclave memory, which might contain confidential data
like a private key, can be copied to the normal memory
through the padding bytes. We also consider potential
countermeasures against these security threats.
1 Introduction
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) is a hardware-
based trusted execution environment (TEE) technology
that allows a user-level process to have an isolated exe-
cution environment, known as an enclave. Even system
software, such as operating system and hypervisor, can-
not access enclave memory, known as the enclave page
cache (EPC), because Intel processor’s memory man-
agement unit (MMU) prohibits such attempts at hard-
ware level. Further, physical attacks, such as a cold-
boot attack, are not possible because every data stored
in EPC banks is encrypted by the memory encryption
engine (MEE) before it leaves from the processor pack-
age.
Intel SGX has two restricted interfaces to allow
SGX encalves to interact with non-enclave applications:
ECALL and OCALL. Non-enclave applications should use
the ECALL interfaces to execute trusted functions within
enclaves. They cannot call any other enclave functions
without corresponding ECALL interfaces. Also, SGX en-
claves should use the OCALL interfaces to execute un-
trusted functions (e.g., system calls). Their any other
attempts to execute untrusted functions (e.g., jumping
into non-enclave code) result in faults.
Intel SGX Software Development Kit (SDK) is
shipped with a tool called Edger8r [1] that automati-
cally and securely generated code for ECALL and OCALL
interfaces. Although SGX enclaves can access both
EPCs and normal memory, non-enclave applications
can only access the normal memory. Thus, all input
and output values for the ECALL and OCALL interfaces
between them need to be stored in the normal mem-
ory first and then copied to the memory of callee and
caller later. The Edger8r tool creates all such edge
routines automatically. It decodes the user-provided en-
clave definition language (EDL) files specifying ECALL
and OCALL interfaces, and generates proxy functions to
securely exchange input and output parameters for the
interfaces. That is, the proxy functions copy data be-
tween enclaves and non-enclave applications as well as
check the sanity of input or output data (e.g., they check
the address range if a parameter is a pointer).
The proxy functions generated by Edger8r need to
be secure because they are designed to copy certain
data (i.e., input values to an OCALL interface and a re-
turn value of an ECALL interface) from the enclave to
the normal memory. If the proxy functions have secu-
rity problems, they might be exploited to extract sensi-
tive data from the enclave that is neither input to OCALL
nor output of ECALL, which results in incomplete confi-
dentiality of Intel SGX.
In this paper, we explore the security problems of
the proxy functions generated by the Edger8r tool for
the ECALL and OCALL interfaces of Intel SGX. More
specifically, we focus on the possibility of data leakage
because of structure padding. When handling struc-
ture data types (e.g., struct in C), modern compil-
ers intentionally align their members by putting some
padding bytes, perhaps to reduce memory/cache access
time [4]. These padding bytes, however, are usually
ignored when initializing structure variables such that
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1 typedef struct {
2 uint64_t val1;
3 uint8_t val2;
4 /* 7-byte padding */
5 uint64_t val3;
6 } test_struct;
Figure 1: Structure with padding (in x86_64). The total size
of this structure is 24 bytes because of the padding.
they can contain uninitialized memory values [2]. If the
proxy functions generated by Edger8r do not consider
this security problem, uninitialized enclave data can be
leaked through padding.
We confirm that when the data types of input values
to an OCALL interface or a return value of an ECALL inter-
face are structures containing padding bytes, uninitial-
ized enclave data is copied to the normal memory via
the padding bytes during OCALL or ECALL by the proxy
functions. This is because the proxy functions are gen-
erated to copy the entire memory of a structure variable,
not to copy its individual members. That is, they do not
perform deep copy.
We expect that the impact of this data leakage prob-
lem through uninitialized structure padding is similar
to that of the Heartbleed vulnerability. As Heartbleed
does, this security problem allows us to leak a number
of bytes from secure enclaves. More importantly, all
data within secure enclaves is supposed to be in plain-
text. This is because the secure enclaves, by design,
ensure the data confidentiality and isolation such that
we do not need to redundantly encrypt the data. That
is, the secure enclaves likely manage the plaintext of
sensitive information (e.g., RSA private key, password,
and biometric information) in their memory, which can
be leaked through the uninitialized structure padding.
Therefore, when developing SGX applications, devel-
opers should carefully consider whether their applica-
tions can suffer from this critical security problem.
Possible countermeasures to this uninitialized
padding problem are as follows: (1) perform per-
member deep copy during ECALL and OCALL, (2)
use the #pragma pack directive to avoid padding,
(3) enforce memset to fully initialize structure vari-
ables, and (4) adopt advanced structure initialization
techniques [2, 3].
2 Background: Structure with Padding
Figure 1 shows an example C structure,
test_struct, which contains padding bytes used
for aligning its member variables. The test_struct
1 test_struct ecall_test_struct(char *encrypted_input,
2 size_t input_size) {
3 char *input;
4 test_struct *ret;
5
6 input = (char*)malloc(sizeof(char) * input_size);
7 decrypt_fun(encrypted_input, input, input_size);
8
9 /* Do something */
10
11 free(input);
12
13 ret = (test_struct*)malloc(sizeof(test_struct));
14
15 /* Do something */
16 ret->val1 = ...;
17 ret->val2 = ...;
18 ret->val3 = ...;
19
20 return *ret;
21 }
Figure 2: ECALL returning test_struct. The padding inside
test_struct is not initialized.
structure has three member variables, val1, val2 and
val3, in which the first and third member variables’
sizes are eight bytes whereas the second member
variable’s size is one byte. If there is no #pragma pack
directive, modern C compilers will put seven-byte
padding between val2 and val3 to align all of the three
member variables for memory access efficiency [4],
so that the size of test_struct will be 24 bytes.
That is, if we have a variable ts whose type is
test_struct, initializing its individual members (i.e.,
ts.val1=0, ts.val2=0, ts.val3=0) is not enough
to fully clean up this variable such that its padding
bytes can contain uninitialized data. Instead, we
have to explicitly initialize padding bytes by using
memset(&ts, 0, sizeof(test_struct)).
3 Uninitialized Enclave Memory Leakage via
Padding
In this section, we explain how uninitialized enclave
memory can be leaked through structure padding. We
focus on the following two cases: (1) ECALL returning
a structure variable with padding (§3.1) and (2) OCALL
having an input structure variable with padding (§3.2).
We used Intel SGX SDK for Linux version 1.9 and a
real system with Core i7-6700K to test the explained
problems and confirmed that all the problems really ex-
isted.
3.1 ECALL Returning Padded Structure
We explain how ECALL functions returning a struc-
ture variable can leak sensitive enclave data through
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1 typedef struct ms_ecall_test_struct_t {
2 test_struct ms_retval;
3 char* ms_encrypted_input;
4 size_t ms_input_size;
5 } ms_ecall_test_struct_t;
6
7 ...
8
9 static sgx_status_t SGX_CDECL
10 sgx_ecall_test_struct(void* pms) {
11 CHECK_REF_POINTER(pms, sizeof(ms_ecall_test_struct_t));
12 ms_ecall_test_struct_t* ms =
13 SGX_CAST(ms_ecall_test_struct_t*, pms);
14 sgx_status_t status = SGX_SUCCESS;
15
16 ms->ms_retval = ecall_test_struct(ms->ms_encrypted_input,
17 ms->ms_input_size);
18 /* no deep copy during returning a value */
19
20 return status;
21 }
Figure 3: Proxy function for ecall_test_struct. The en-
tire content of test_struct including the padding is returned
to the non-enclave memory.
padding. Figure 2 shows an example ECALL function
that returns a padded structure, test_struct, explained
in §2. This function receives two input values, performs
some computations with them, and eventually returns
test_struct. Since this function does not clear the
padding bytes of test_struct, they can contain unini-
tialized enclave data and be returned to a proxy function
generated by the Edger8r tool.
Figure 3 represents a proxy function for the
ecall_test_struct function, which is automatically
generated by Edger8r to be executed inside an en-
clave. As shown in Line 16, this proxy function just
fully copies the return value of ecall_test_struct
into ms->ms_retval, a non-enclave marshalled struc-
ture for storing input and out values for this ECALL func-
tion, instead of individually copying its members to
pms->ms_retval.
Therefore, we conclude that an ECALL proxy function
can copy uninitialized padding bytes from an enclave to
a non-enclave memory region when returning a struc-
ture variable, which can potentially contain uninitial-
ized sensitive enclave data.
3.2 OCALL Receiving Padded Structure as Input
Next, we explain how OCALL functions receiving
a structure variable as input can leak sensitive data
through padding. Figure 4 shows an example OCALL
function, ocall_test_struct, that receives a padded
structure, test_struct, as input. This function tries to
access every single byte of a test_struct variable, ts,
1 void ocall_test_struct(test_struct ts, int val) {
2 /* Do something with ts and val */
3
4 uint8_t* bytes = (uint8_t*)&ts;
5 for (int i = 0; sizeof(test_struct); ++i) {
6 printf("%0x ", bytes[i]);
7 }
8 }
Figure 4: OCALL receiving test_struct as input. This func-
tion can access the data in the padding if it is not initialized.
1 typedef struct ms_ocall_test_struct_t {
2 test_struct ms_ts;
3 int ms_val;
4 } ms_ocall_test_struct_t;
5
6 ...
7
8 sgx_status_t SGX_CDECL
9 ocall_test_struct(test_struct ts, int val) {
10 sgx_status_t status = SGX_SUCCESS;
11
12 ms_ocall_test_struct_t* ms = NULL;
13 size_t ocalloc_size = sizeof(ms_ocall_test_struct_t);
14 void *__tmp = NULL;
15
16 __tmp = sgx_ocalloc(ocalloc_size);
17 if (__tmp == NULL) {
18 sgx_ocfree();
19 return SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
20 }
21 ms = (ms_ocall_test_struct_t*)__tmp;
22 __tmp = (void *)((size_t)__tmp +
23 sizeof(ms_ocall_test_struct_t));
24
25 ms->ms_ts = ts; /* no deep copy */
26 ms->ms_val = val;
27 status = sgx_ocall(2, ms);
28
29 sgx_ocfree();
30 return status;
31 }
Figure 5: Proxy function for ocall_test_struct. The en-
tire content of test_struct including the padding is passed
to ocall_test_struct() as an input parameter.
implying that if this input struct contains padding with
sensitive enclave data, this function can access them it
also.
Figure 5 shows a proxy function of
ocall_test_struct that will be executed inside
an enclave. This function allocates a non-enclave
memory region for a marshalled structure (Line 16)
and copies an input structure variable, ts, into it (Line
25) while doing not handle the individual members of
the structure.
Therefore, we conclude that an OCALL proxy function
can copy uninitialized padding bytes from an enclave
to a non-enclave memory region when the correspond-
ing OCALL function receives a structure variable as input,
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which can potentially contain uninitialized sensitive en-
clave data.
4 Potential Countermeasures
In this section, we explain possible countermeasures
against the sensitive enclave data leakage problem
because of padding, which can be implemented in
the future. First, we can revise the Edger8r tool to
generate proxy functions that individually copy the
member of a structure variable during ECALL and OCALL
(i.e., deep copy). For example, in Figure 5, we can do
ms->ms_ts.val1=ts.val1, ms->ms_ts.val2=ts.val2,
and ms->ms_ts.val3=ts.val3, instead of
ms->ms_ts=ts to do not leak uninitialized padding.
However, it makes proxy functions be complicated
especially when they are dealing with a complex struc-
ture variable recursively containing other structures.
Second, we can enforce #pragma pack directive to
eliminate any padding, but it introduces performance
overhead because of a lack of memory alignment.
Third, whenever we allocate a structure variable inside
an enclave, we can use memset() to fully initialize all
of its memory. This countermeasure can avoid any
potential data leakage problems, but it can experience
performance degradation. Fourth, as Lu et al. [2] and
Milburn et al. [3] do, we can implement advanced
memory initialization techniques to selectively initial-
ize padding bytes only when they can leak sensitive
data. We believe that this is the most practical solution
against the explored problems such that, in the future,
we will figure out the best memory initialization
technique for Intel SGX to eradicate the uninitialized
enclave data leakage problem.
Responsible Disclosure
We have reported this uninitialized padding problem to
Intel on June 23, 2017. After having numerous discus-
sions with us, Intel SGX SDK developers informed that
this padding issue will be explicitly warned in the SDK
documentation to describe this issue and potential miti-
gation approaches.
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